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  1 
PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL 
RESOURCES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE AND THE RIGHT 
TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
RICARDO PEREIRA* AND ORLA GOUGH 
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources has emerged as a fundamental principle in 
international law, DOORZLQJ SRVWFRORQLDO VWDWHV WR DVVHUW IXOO VRYHUHLJQW\ RU µVRYHUHLJQ ULJKWV¶
over natural resources found within the limits of their jurisdiction. Despite the postcolonial 
context in which the first United Nations General Assembly resolutions in the field were adopted, 
there has been an increasing recognition that the right to permanent sovereignty should be given 
a wider scope and could start to legitimise the claims of non-state actors and communities in 
defining ownership and usage rights over the natural resources within a state. Indeed, 
international law has evolved to recognise a number of substantive and procedural rights for 
indigenous peoples, including: ownership rights over natural resources; the right to participate 
in decision-making and to prior and informed consent in the context of natural resources 
extraction projects; and the sharing of benefits arising from the exploration and commercial 
exploitation of natural resources in indigenous lands. This paper argues that the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources complements and further refines the right of  
self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQRIµSHRSOHV¶XQGHULQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ while establishing important parameters 
for the allocation of property rights in natural resources. Moreover, by implementing substantive 
and procedural rights that allow indigenous peoples to exercise resource rights, it is suggested 
that states have transferred sovereign powers over natural resources to non-state actors, thus 
upsetting the notion of permanent sovereignty as a right belonging to states. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Indigenous peoples in many parts of the world have had a tragic history of 
forced assimilation and deprivation of their lands. While descendants of 
European settlers achieved political independence from colonial powers, 
indigenous peoples within the former colonies remained the target of 
GLVFULPLQDWLRQ DQG GHSULYDWLRQ RI WKHLU ODQGV µLQWHUQDO FRORQLDOLVP¶1). As 
indigenous peoples did not hold title to land in a way that European legal 
systems recognised, it was easy to divorce them from their ancestral territories to 
make way for colonial landowners. Tribes were assigned to reservations on 
marginal land, but even the rights of indigenous peoples over this land have 
rarely been regarded as sacrosanct, even today. 
Indian treaties with European powers concerning their land rights were 
usually disregarded once colonies gained independence.2 From that time until 
relatively recently, indigenous rights ² unlike the rights of religious and other 
minorities ² were not recognised as an issue of international concern.3 In a 
pivotal determination made by a British-American arbitration tribunal in 1926 in 
the Cayuga Indians dispute,4 it was held that the Cayuga Nation and the Cayuga 
as individuals had no legal status under international law.5 However, the growth 
of international human rights law has challenged this view, calling for the 
modernisation of classical international law to make individuals, as well as 
groups of individuals, beneficiaries of international human rights.6 
                                                 
 
1
 Erica-,UHQH$'DHV µ3URWHFWLRQRI WKH:RUOG¶V ,QGLJHQRXV3HRSOHVDQG+XPDQ5LJKWV¶ LQ
Janusz Symonides (ed), Human Rights: Concept and Standards (UNESCO and Ashgate, 
2000) 301, 302. 
 
2
 +XUVW +DQQXP µ7KH 3URWHFWLRQ RI ,QGLJHQRXV 5LJKWV LQ WKH ,QWHU-$PHULFDQ 6\VWHP¶ LQ
David J Harris and Stephen Livingstone (eds), The Inter-American System of Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, 1998) 323, 324. 
 
3
 Ibid. 
 
4
 Cayuga Indians (Great Britain v United States) (Awards) (1926) 6 RIAA 173.  
 
5
 ,ELG:0LFKDHO5HLVPDQµ3URWHFWLQJ,QGLJHQRXV5LJKWVLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO$GMXGLFDWLRQ¶
(1995) 89 American Journal of International Law 5LFDUGR03HUHLUDµ7KH5LJKW
to Reproductive Self-'HWHUPLQDWLRQ RI ,QGLJHQRXV 3HRSOHV XQGHU +XPDQ 5LJKWV /DZ¶ LQ
Sabine Berking and Magdalena Zolkos (eds), Between Life and Death: Governing 
Populations in the Era of Human Rights (Peter Lang, 2009) 303, 304. 
 
6
 3HUHLUDµ7KH5LJKWWR5HSURGXFWLYH6HOI-'HWHUPLQDWLRQ¶DERYHQ5, 304. See also Richard 
)DON µ7KH5LJKWVRI3HRSOHV ,Q3DUWLFXODU ,QGLJHQRXV3HRSOHV¶ LQ -DPHV &UDZIRUG HG
The Rights of Peoples (Oxford University Press, 1988) 17, 17±37. 
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Although the International Labour OrganizDWLRQ µ,/2¶ DQG WKH 8QLWHG
1DWLRQV *HQHUDO $VVHPEO\ µ81*$¶ KDYH DGRSWHG LQVWUXPHQWV WKDW Uecognise 
specific fundamental rights for indigenous peoples ² including the right to land 
and natural resources7 ² none of the following major international or regional 
agreements refer specifically to indigenous peoples: the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,8 the 1966 international human rights covenants,9 the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination,10 or the European11 and inter-American human rights 
instruments, including the American Convention on Human Rights µAmerican 
Convention¶.12 
$VWDWH¶V FODLP WR VRYHUHLJQW\RYHUQDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV LV RIWHQSXW WR WKH WHVW
when local communities, including indigenous groups, claim individual or group 
resource rights. These claims often clash with the interests of economic operators 
in the natural resources sector. The notion of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, although originally established in the postcolonial period as the legal 
basis for the claims of sovereignty over natural resources by developing states, 
has been given a wider purpose in more recent years and could arguably be used 
as the basis to legitimise the claims of non-state actors and communities in 
defining ownership and usage rights over the natural resources within a state. 
Thus, the right to permanent sovereignty accrues not only to states in the 
postcolonial period, but has also been recognised as a basis for individuals and 
FRPPXQLWLHVWRFKDOOHQJHWKHLUJRYHUQPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQs to grant exploration and 
exploitation rights to foreign companies, which may be regarded as 
disadvantageous.13 The classical Westphalian conception of sovereignty14 is 
arguably no longer able to live up to the evolutionary nature of international law 
                                                 
 
7
 See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295,  
UN GAOR, 61st sess, 107th plen mtg, Agenda Item 68, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 
2FWREHUDQQH[µUnited Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples¶
DUW  µUNDRIP¶ Convention (No 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries, opened for signature 27 June 1989, 1650 UNTS 383 (entered into 
force 5 September 1991) art 1µILO Convention 169¶ 
 
8
  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess,  
183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948). 
 
9
 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) µICCPR¶
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature  
'HFHPEHU8176HQWHUHGLQWRIRUFH-DQXDU\µICESCR¶ 
 
10
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened 
for signature 7 March 1966, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969). 
 
11
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222 (entered into force 3 September 1953), as 
amended by Protocol No 14bis to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 27 May 2009, CETS No 204 (entered into 
IRUFH6HSWHPEHUµEuropean Convention on Human Rights¶ 
 
12
 American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 22 November 1969,  
 8176  HQWHUHG LQWR IRUFH  -XO\  µAmerican Convention¶ 6HH DOVR 
3HUHLUDµ7KH5LJKWWR5HSURGXFWLYH6HOI-'HWHUPLQDWLRQ¶DERYHQ5, 304. 
 
13
 See, eg, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA Res 1803 (XVII), UN GAOR, 
17th sess, 1194th plen PWJ 81 'RF $5(6;9,,  'HFHPEHU  µRPSNR¶
The RPSNR is discussed further below. See also (PHND'XUXLJERµ3HUPDQHQW6RYHUHLJQW\
DQG 3HRSOHV¶ 2ZQHUVKLS RI 1DWXUDO 5HVRXUFHV LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶   George 
Washington International Law Review 33, 61. 
 
14
 That is, the modern form of state sovereignty based on the principle of territorial integrity as 
established in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. 
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because it is increasingly moving away from its primarily state-centred focus 
towards recognising the rights of participation of non-state actors in  
decision-making and the access of these actors to justice.15 
This article aims to assess the extent to which the rights to permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources and to self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI µSHRSOHV¶
(meaning a collective group of individuals within a state) have been elaborated 
into specific substantive and procedural norms of international law in order to 
DGYDQFH LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ FROOHFWLYH FODLP IRU VHOI-determination over land 
and natural resources. This article also analyses the extent to which these rights 
and duties upset the notion of permanent sovereignty, primarily conceived as a 
right belonging to states. As such, it deals with the often-thorny dilemma of 
reconciling state sovereignty and collective rights over natural resources and 
contends that permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the right to  
self-determination are rights to be accorded to all peoples ² including 
indigenous peoples. It will be argued that both rights are to be regarded as 
FRPSOHPHQWDU\LQVHFXULQJLQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶FODLPVIRUDXWRQRP\RYHUWKHLU
land and natural resources, revitalising the debate on the interplay between state 
sovereignty over natural resources on the one hand and the rights of peoples to 
assert resource rights on the other. 
Part II reviews the historical evolution and the legal nature of the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources in international law. Part III 
discusses the notion of indigenouV SHRSOHV¶ ULJKW WR VHOI-determination under 
international law, in both its external and internal forms. Part IV reviews the 
substantive and procedural international norms that allow for the realisation of 
LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ ODQG DQG QDWXUDO UHVRXUFH ULJKts. In particular, the paper 
discusses the extent to which international law recognises communal land 
systems traditionally applied by indigenous peoples, which are often not in line 
with the Western conventional land system of registration. Moreover, the article 
assesses procedural obligations to give effect to those land and natural resources 
rights ² notably the right of indigenous communities to be consulted and to 
SULRU DQG LQIRUPHG FRQVHQW LQ FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK H[WUDFWLYH LQGXVWULHV¶ 
projects ² and assesses the extent to which the exercise of these participatory 
rights conflict with the principle of state sovereignty. Finally, Part V assesses the 
international forums available for the DVVHUWLRQRI LQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶ODQGDQG
natural resources rights, with reference to the jurisprudence of international and 
regional courts and tribunals and treaty monitoring bodies. The paper concludes 
WKDW WKH IRUPXODWLRQ RI LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ ODQG DQG QDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV ULJKWV
under international law, which includes both substantive and procedural 
elements, goes beyond addressing the question of allocation of property rights to 
redefine the fundamental notion of the sovereignty of states over natural 
resources. 
                                                 
 
15
 6HH JHQHUDOO\ )HGHULFR /HQ]HULQL µ6RYHUHLJQW\ 5HYLVLWHG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ DQG 3DUDOOHO
6RYHUHLJQW\RI,QGLJHQRXV3HRSOHV¶Texas International Law Journal 155, 160. 
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II THE PRINCIPLE OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 
A Historical Evolution of the Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources 
The struggle for sovereignty over natural resources arguably began in the  
19th century when the movement for political independence started to develop in 
some regions, including Latin America.16 Following the end of the World War II 
in 1945, the movement gained impetus as postcolonial developing country 
regimes ² particularly in Africa and Asia ² started to claim the right to 
sovereignty over natural resources.17 The decolonisation period was a catalyst 
for many developing countries (in particular those in Latin America) to start to 
contest the validity of concession agreements which their governments had 
entered into with foreign investors ² or were imposed during colonial  
times ² for exploration and exploitation of natural resources. One of the major 
points of contention was the fact that these concession agreements tended to be 
largely one-sided and they strongly favoured the interests of the foreign 
investor.18 
                                                 
 
16
 See JHQHUDOO\ 0DWV ,QJXOVWDG DQG /XFDV /L[LQVNL µ5DZ 0DWHULDOV 5DFH DQG /HJDO
Regimes: The Development of the Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
5HVRXUFHVLQWKH$PHULFDV¶World History Bulletin 34. 
 
17
 5LFDUGR 3HUHLUD µ7KH ([SORUDtion and Exploitation of Energy Resources in International 
/DZ¶ LQ .DUHQ ( 0DNXFK DQG 5LFDUGR 3HUHLUD HGV Environmental and Energy Law 
%ODFNZHOO    6HH DOVR <LQND 2PRURJEH DQG 3HWHU 2QLHPROD µ3URSHUW\
Rights in Oil and Gas under Domanial 5HJLPHV¶LQ$LOHHQ0F+DUJHWDOHGVProperty and 
the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford University Press, 2010) 115, 120±2, 124. 
As regards onshore resources, states have permanent sovereign rights over natural resources 
under general international law. Hence, they are free to determine whether subsoil resources 
are owned by the state or private landowners. Most civil law countries vest ownership of 
subsoil resources in the surface landowner, though an exception is usually made for energy 
resources such as oil, gas and coal, which are subject to state ownership. The Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland and Spain as well as the United Kingdom (which is not a civil law country) 
IROORZ WKLV PRGHO $V UHJDUGV RIIVKRUH HQHUJ\ UHVRXUFHV FRDVWDO VWDWHV KDYH µVovereign 
ULJKWV¶ LQ WKH FRQWLQHQWDO VKHOI DQG IXQFWLRQDO MXULVGLFWLRQ IRU SXUSRVHV RI H[SORULQJ DQG
exploiting, but not ownership rights. Notwithstanding, several states claim not only the right 
to regulate but also the ownership of offshore oil and gas in their continental shelves: for 
H[DPSOH'HQPDUNWKH1HWKHUODQGV1RUZD\DQG6SDLQ7KHDOORFDWLRQRIVWDWHV¶ULJKWVDQG
duties in the different maritime zones is regulated under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea: opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into 
IRUFH  1RYHPEHU  µConvention on the Law of the Sea¶. See also Pereira, 
µ([SORUDWLRQDQG([SORLWDWLRQRI(QHUJ\5HVRXUFHV¶DERYHQ17, 200. 
 
18
 This is so, in particular, because concession agreements accord vast areas of acreage 
committed for long periods to one company. As such, little or no control is possessed by the 
VRYHUHLJQRYHUWKHPXOWLQDWLRQDOFRUSRUDWLRQ¶VRSHUDWLRQVDQGKRVWVWDWHVSDUWLFLSDWHPHUHO\
on a royalty basis. Hence the traditional concession agreements posed a threat to the host 
VWDWH¶VSHUPDQHQWVRYHUHLJQW\RYHUQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHV7KHUHIRUHWKH\KDYHODUJHO\IDOOHQLQWR
disuse, giving way to new contractual forms ²production sharing agreements, risk service 
FRQWUDFWV MRLQW YHQWXUHV DQG µPRGHUQ FRQFHVVLRQV¶ LQ SDUWLFXODU 0 6RUQDUDMDK The 
Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (Kluwer Law International, 2000) 43. These 
reflect a more balanced distribution of rights and duties between the foreign oil companies 
and the host state. For a discussion of this: see, eg, at 43; M Sornarajah, The International 
Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 38±41; Nico 
Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge 
University Press, 1997) 174± $QLWD 5RQQH µ3XEOLF DQG 3ULYDWH 5LJKWV WR 1DWXUDO
5HVRXUFHVDQG'LIIHUHQFHVLQWKHLU3URWHFWLRQ"¶LQ$LOHHQ0F+DUJHWDOHGVProperty and 
the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford University Press, 2010) 60, 68±9; 
3HUHLUDµ([SORUDWLRQDQG([SORLWDWLRQRI(QHUJ\5HVRXUFHV¶DERYHQ17, 200. 
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 The will to reinforce the sovereignty of newly independent and other 
developing states and, subsequently, the desire to secure the benefits of natural 
resource exploitation for non-self-governing peoples, led to the adoption of the 
UN General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources µRPSNR¶RQ'HFHPEHU19 The RPSNR recognised the right 
of the host state to nationalise and expropriate the property of the foreign 
investor, provided that appropriate compensation is paid. It asserted each 
FRXQWU\¶V ULJKWV WR FKRRVH LWV RZQ HFRQRPLF V\VWHP DQG H[HUFLVH VRYHUHLJQW\
over natural resources. 
The debate concerning permanent sovereignty received a new dimension in 
ZKHQGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVSUHVVHGIRUDµQHZGHDO¶LQWKHLUUHODWLRQVZLth 
developed countries. This pressure was reflected in the passing of the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States µCharter of Economic Rights and 
Duties¶.20 Adopted by the UNGA in December 1974, the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties reinforced the essential elements of the right to permanent 
sovereignty as agreed in 1962, yet with some fundamental differences.21 One 
important difference between the two is that, unlike the 1962 RPSNR, the 1974 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties controversially favoured the laws and 
jurisdiction of the courts of the host state for the settlement of investment 
disputes.22 Moreover, the RPSNR includes reference to international law, while 
                                                 
 
19
 RPSNR, GA Res 1803 (XVII), UN GAOR, 17th sess, 1194th plen mtg, UN Doc 
A/RES/1803(XVII) (14 December 1962). The RPSNR is based on the work of the United 
Nations Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Economic 
and Social Council. The RPSNR affirmed that the right of peoples and nations to permanent 
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their 
national development and of the wellbeing of the state concerned. Particularly, at para 4, 
[n]ationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons 
of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding 
purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the 
owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force 
in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance 
with international law.  
 It also provided, at para 8, that  
[f]oreign investment agreements freely entered into by or between sovereign States 
shall be observed in good faith; State and international organizations shall strictly 
and conscientiously respect the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural 
wealth and resources in accordance with the [Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States] and the principles set forth in the present resolution. 
The RPSNR was passed with 87 votes in favour and 2 votes against (France and South 
Africa), with 12 abstentions: Schrijver, above n 18, 76. 
 
20
 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res 3281 (XXIX), UN GAOR,  
29th sess, 2315th plen mtg, Agenda Item 48, Supp No 31, UN Doc A/RES/3281(XXIX)  
'HFHPEHUDQQH[µCharter of Economic Rights and Duties of States¶µCharter of 
Economic Rights and Duties¶ 
 
21
 The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties DIILUPHGLQDUWµHYHU\VWDWHKDVDQGVKDOO
freely exercise full permanent sovereignty including possession, use and disposal, over all 
LWV ZHDOWK QDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV DQG HFRQRPLF DFWLYLWLHV¶ 6HH DOVR 3HUHLUD µ([SORUDWLon and 
([SORLWDWLRQRI(QHUJ\5HVRXUFHV¶DERYHQ16, 201±2. 
22
  Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties also recognised the right of 
each state to (emphasis added): 
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the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties omits such a reference ² which 
could be regarded as a move by developing countries to constrain the ability of 
foreign investors to rely on international standards in the event of expropriation 
of the investment.23 These differences certainly help to explain why the Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties was backed by a majority of developing 
countries, but virtually no developed countries.24  
These two UNGA permanent sovereignty resolutions need to be read in light 
of the general principles and standards of international law. A fundamental 
customary international rule ² often regarded as the cornerstone of international 
environmental law ² is that no state can use its territory to cause serious 
environmental damage to other states or to areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
This is enshrined in major declarations outlining principles of international 
environmental law, as well as in treaties.25 So whilst international law recognises 
a state¶VµVRYHUHLJQULJKWWRH[SORLW[its] own [natural] resources pursuant to [its] 
own environmental and developmeQWDOSROLFLHV¶26 it limits state sovereignty over 
the way natural resources are managed.27 Hence states do not have an absolute 
and unfettered right to explore and exploit their natural resources, in that they 
have an obligation to respect the rights of other states and not cause  
                                                 
nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case 
appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking 
into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State 
considers pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a 
controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and 
by its tribunals, unless it is freely mutually agreed by all States concerned that other 
peaceful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in 
accordance with the principle of free choice of means. 
 
23
 3HUHLUD µ([SORUDWLRQ DQG ([SORLWDWLRQ RI (QHUJ\ 5HVRXUFHV¶ DERYH Q 16, 202; Schrijver, 
above n 18, 103±9. 
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10 abstentions: Schrijver, above n 183HUHLUDµ([SORUDWLRQDQG([SORLWDWLRQRI(QHUJ\
5HVRXUFHV¶DERYHQ16, 201±2. 
 
25
 The no harm-rule is elaborated, for instance, in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration and 
Principle 21 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment: see Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.1) (12 August 1992) annex 1  
priQFLSOH  µRio Declaration on Environment and Development¶ µRio Declaration¶
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,  
81 'RF $&21)5HY  -DQXDU\  FK  SULQFLSOH  µDeclaration of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment¶,WLVDOVRSUHVHQWLQLQWHUQDWLRQDO
environmental agreements: see, eg, Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for 
signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993) art 14(1)(d) 
µCBD¶United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 
0D\8176HQWHUHGLQWRIRUFH0DUFK3UHDPEOHµUNFCCC¶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As an example of the application of this principle, see Trail Smelter Case (United  
States v Canada) (Awards) (1  5,$$  5LFDUGR 3HUHLUD µ&RPSOLDQFH DQG
(QIRUFHPHQW LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO (XURSHDQ DQG 1DWLRQDO (QYLURQPHQWDO /DZ¶ LQ .DUHQ (
Makuch and Ricardo Pereira (eds), Environmental and Energy Law (Blackwell Publishing, 
2012) 561, 561. 
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 Rio Declaration, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.1), principle 2. 
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 Ibid. 
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cross-boundary harm.28 The right to permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, given that it includes an element of both the right of  
self-determination and the principle of state sovereignty, is also subject to the 
general limitations of the principle of state sovereignty under international law.29 
Hence it has been suggested that it is at least questionable that DVWDWH¶VFODLPRI
sovereign rights to freely explore, exploit and dispose of its natural resources can 
be based on thHDVVHUWLRQFRPPRQO\PDGHWKDWµWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHSHRSOHV
in a resource rich region of a State ... are entitled to (extra) benefit from resource 
exploitation in their region is ... a matter of domestic politics¶.30 The principle of 
permanent sovereignty continues to be of the greatest significance in connection 
WR DOLHQ HFRQRPLF LQWHUHVWVZLWKLQ D FRXQWU\¶V WHUULWRU\ FDUHIXOO\EDODQFLQJ WKH
KRVW VWDWH¶V right to nationalisation and expropriation with the right to prompt, 
fair and adequate compensation for foreign investors.31 Yet it is also firmly 
established that the right to permanent sovereignty does not exempt states from 
the imperatives of international law generally. Nor does it specifically exempt 
states from the rules of human rights law as they relate to management and 
governance of natural resources.32 Hence it has been correctly suggested that 
                                                 
 
28
 Ibid. This obligation includes duties to undertake environment impact assessment and notify 
other states in cases where the exploitation or uses of natural resources have the potential to 
cause harm to other states. The International Court of JXVWLFH µ,&-¶ recognised a duty to 
undertake trans-boundary impact assessment as a duty under international law: see, eg, Pulp 
Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14, 72±3 
[204].  
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 +HUVFK/DXWHUSDFKWVXJJHVWV WKDW µVRYHUHLJQW\LVQRWLQWKHQDWXUHRIDQDEVROXWHDQGULJLG
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+HUVFK/DXWHUSDFKWThe Development of International Law by the International 
Court (Stevens and Sons, 1958) 324. On the historical evolution of the notion of state 
sovereignty: see generally Duruigbo, above n 13, 38±40; Schrijver, above n 18, 377. 
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 Schrijver, above n 18, 9. See also Lila Barrera-+HUQDQGH] µ6RYHUHLJQW\ RYHU 1DWXUDO
Resources under Examination: The Inter-American System for Human Rights and Natural 
5HVRXUFH$OORFDWLRQ¶Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law 43. 
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 Notably, the law on state responsibility developed in response to the treatment of US foreign 
LQYHVWPHQWV LQ /DWLQ $PHULFD ZKLFK OHG WR &RUGHOO +XOO¶V 6HFUHWDU\ RI 6WDWH GXULQJ WKH
0H[LFDQ H[SURSULDWLRQV RI  VWDWHPHQW WKDW µXQGHU HYHU\ UXOH RI ODZ DQG equity, no 
government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without 
SURYLVLRQIRUSURPSWDGHTXDWHDQGHIIHFWLYHSD\PHQWWKHUHIRU¶/HWWHUIURP866HFUHWDU\RI
State to Mexican Ambassador (22 August 1938), reproduced in Andreas F Lowenfield, 
International Economic Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2008) 478. This statement, 
DOVRNQRZQDVµWKH+XOOIRUPXOD¶VXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUZDVHQWLWOHGWRGLVSXWH
resolution before an overseas tribunal if the remedies provided by the host state proved 
inadequate. 
 
32
 See, eg, Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, opened for signature 20 March 1952, ETS No 9 (entered into force  
18 May 1954), as amended by Protocol No 11 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 11 May 1994, ETS No 155 
(entered into force 1 November 1998) art 1. This article recognises the right to property as a 
fundamental human right:  
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his [or her] 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his [or her] possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. 
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µ>D@VXQGHUVWRRGWRGD\SHUPDQHQWVRYHUHLJQW\RYHUQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVLVDVPXFK
DQLVVXHRIVWDWHGXWLHVDVLWLVRQHRIVWDWHULJKWV¶33 
B Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources as the Right of Peoples 
Drawing from political theorisations of sovereignty, it has been suggested that 
resource sovereignty cannot be territorially circumscribed within the national 
space and institutionally circumscribed within the state apparatus. Rather, 
sovereignty must be understood in relational terms and take into account the 
global geography of non-state actors that shape access to and control over natural 
resources.34  
Hence there is evidence that the classical Westphalian notion of state sovereignty 
is increasingly being superseded by a less state-centric conception of sovereignty 
that recognises the rights of non-state actors.35 
Although the right to permanent sovereignty, as recognised under the Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties, LV D ULJKW EHORQJLQJ WR µVWDWHV¶36 the 1962 
RPSNR clearly explains that peoples are also beneficiaries of the right to 
permanent sovereignty.37 Further evidence of state practice recognising the 
sovereign rights of peoples is found in art 1 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights µICCPR¶38 and art 1 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights µICESCR¶which recognises the right of 
peoples to self-determination.39 
On the other hand, since one of the main aims of the UNGA permanent 
sovereignty resolutions, particularly the RPSNR (and the right to  
self-determination in general), was to facilitate the ending of colonial rule (as 
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 Barrera-Hernandez, above n 30, 44. See also -RQD5D]]DTXHµ5HVRXUFH6RYHUHLJQW\LQWKH
*OREDO(QYLURQPHQWDO2UGHU¶LQ(OHQD%ODQFRDQG-RQD5D]]DTXHHGVNatural Resources 
and the Green Economy: Redefining the Challenges for People, States and Corporations 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) 81, 83±90.  
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7HUULWRU\DQG*ROG0LQLQJLQ7DQ]DQLD¶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Political Geography 70, 70. 
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 See generally Lenzerini, above n 15, 156±60. Participatory rights for non-state actors are 
recognised under certain treaty regimes. For example, art 3 of the Aarhus Convention 
recognises specific procedural rights for non-JRYHUQPHQWDO RUJDQLVDWLRQV 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 DQG
individuals and requires national legal systems to be consistent with this obligation: 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters, opened for signature 25 June 1998, 2161 UNTS 447 
HQWHUHG LQWR IRUFH  2FWREHU  DUW  µAarhus Convention¶ 7KH Aarhus  
Convention also includes a noncompliance procedure under which NGOs may bring 
complaints: at art 15. 
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 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, UN Doc A/RES/3281(XXIX), annex art 2(1). 
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 RPSNR, UN Doc A/RES/1803, para 1. 
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 ICCPR, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force  
23 March 1976). 
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 ICESCR, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force  
3 January 1976). Article 1(2) states that  
all peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic 
cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no 
case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 
   Article 47 of the ICCPR VWDWHVWKDWµ>Q@RWKLQJLQWKHSUHVHQWCovenant shall be interpreted as 
impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural 
ZHDOWKDQGUHVRXUFHV¶ 
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well as to allow newer states to guard their sovereignty)40 it could be argued that 
once the peoples in a state gained independence, it would no longer be necessary 
to focus on the rights of peoples in any discussion of permanent sovereignty. 
,QGHHGµLIJRYHUQPHQWVDUHYHVWHGZLWKDULJKWLWLVQRWQHFHVVDU\WRDOVRYHVWLW 
LQWKHSHRSOHWKH\UHSUHVHQW¶41 This is reflected in the fact that many documents 
dealing with the principle of permanent sovereignty after 1962 contain few or no 
references WRµSHRSOHV¶42 
Yet there are strong grounds for peoples to be entitled to the right to 
permanent sovereignty.43 One important practical implication of the recognition 
that the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is held by peoples 
is that it could arguably form the basis of a challenge WRDJRYHUQPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQ
to authorise multinational companies to operate in the natural resource sector in a 
VWDWH¶VWHUULWRU\44 Governments would also be bound to utilise natural resources 
with a view towards benefiting the whole population.45 Hence, the realisation of 
the right to permanent sovereignty as belonging also to peoples adds new 
relevancy to the RPSNR in the postcolonial period, directing sovereign states to 
XVHUHVRXUFHVIRUµWKHZHOO EHLQJRIWKHLUSHRSOHV¶46 In order to ensure that states 
respect public goods, there are recognised limits imposed on the way sovereignty 
over natural resources is exercised, through, among other things, the allocation of 
property rights and the establishment of procedures for communities to 
participate in the adoption of, or to challenge, decisions affecting these 
resources.47 +HQFHWKHULJKWWRSHUPDQHQWVRYHUHLJQW\QHHGVWREHH[HUFLVHGµIRU
national development and [the] well being of the people of the state 
FRQFHUQHG¶.48 Moreover, states should enter into foreign investment agreements 
in good faith and respect the µVRYHUHLJQW\ RI SHRSOHV DQG QDWLRQV RYHU WKHLU
QDWXUDOZHDOWKDQGUHVRXUFHV¶49 
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 Duruigbo, above n 13, 49. 
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 Ibid 52; Schrijver, above n 18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  Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 463, 463±79.  
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 RPSNR, UN Doc A/RES/1803, para 1; Razzaque, above n 33, 83. 
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 RPSNR, UN Doc A/RES/1803, para 8. This is reflected in some national constitutions which 
require that states use natural resources for the benefit of the people: see, eg, Constitution of 
Kenya 2010 (Kenya) art 69(1)(h) (which requires the sWDWH WR µXWLOLVH WKHHQYLURQPHQWDQG 
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2013] Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 11 
C The Legal Status of the Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources 
The fact that the principle of permanent sovereignty emerged from a 
resolution of the UNGA made it possible for it to gain more rapid acceptance 
among states than if it had been developed only through the practice of 
individual states.50 Yet from a legal perspective, one significant limitation of the 
UNGA resolutions is that they are not legally binding. They are also not 
recognised as formal sources of international law under art 38(1) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice.51 Nonetheless, such resolutions can provide 
the basis for the formation of customary international law. For instance, the 
RPSNR was adopted by most developed and developing states with few 
objections and abstentions. It could be argued that this reflects the evolution of 
state practice and opinio juris leading to the recognition of the principle of 
permanent sovereignty as having the status of customary international law. 
Further evidence of state practice giving legal recognition to the permanent 
sovereignty principle is its incorporation in national constitutions and foreign 
investment codes.52 
In contrast, most commentators do not consider that the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties has transitioned into a rule of customary international law.53 
Indeed, one of the most contentious aspects of the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties is that it suggests that only the courts and the law of the host state are 
to be applied to foreign investment disputes.54 The origins of this are often traced 
back to the so-FDOOHG µ&DOYR DRFWULQH¶ ZKLFK LV ZLGHO\ XSKHOG E\ GHYHORSLQJ
states in the context of the expropriation of foreign-owned investment.55 Hence, 
                                                 
 
50
 3HUHLUD µ([SORUDWLRQ DQG ([SORLWDWLRQ RI (QHUJ\ 5HVRXUFHV¶ DERYH Q 16, 203. See also 
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sovereignty over natural resources in foreign investment codes, see, eg, Antonio R Parra, 
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Ibrahim F I Shihata (ed), Legal Treatment of Foreign Investments: The World Bank 
Guidelines (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) 311, 311±12. 
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UN Doc A/RES/3281(XXIX), annex art 2(1). 
 
55
  7KH µ&DOYR 'RFWULQH¶ ZDV DGYRFDWHG E\ VRPH /DWLQ $PHULFDQ VWDWHV LQ WKH V )LUVW
enunciated by Carlos Calvo ² an eminent Argentinean jurist who claimed that any foreign 
investment dispute should be settled before the courts of the host state ² the Calvo Doctrine 
prohibits the investor from seeking diplomatic protection for third-party judicial settlement 
EHIRUHORFDOUHPHGLHVDUHH[KDXVWHGVHHHJ3DWULFN-XOOLDUGµ&DOYR'RFWULQH&DOYR&ODXVH¶
(2007) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. 
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it is difficult to consider the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties in its 
entirety as developing principles of international law or customary international 
law, as it has been primarily only developing states and economies in transition 
that have supported it.56 
Despite these different interpretations of the two UNGA permanent 
sovereignty resolutions, today it is generally accepted that permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources is a prerequisite for economic development and is 
therefore a fundamental principle of contemporary international law.57 In the 
East Timor case,58 WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXUWRI-XVWLFHµ,&-¶KDGWKHRSSRUWXQLW\
to rule upon a claim in which the question of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources was raised.59 However, the ICJ did not address the legal status of 
SHUPDQHQW VRYHUHLJQW\ RYHU QDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV 'HVSLWH 3RUWXJDO¶V FODLP WKDW
$XVWUDOLD KDG YLRODWHG (DVW 7LPRU¶V ULJKW WR SHUPDQHQW VRYHUHLJQW\ RYHU LWV
natural resources, the majority opinion of the ICJ found that it lacked jurisdiction 
to decide the case on the merits, as it considered that Indonesia was an essential 
SDUW\ WR WKH GLVSXWH DQG LW KDG QRW DFFHSWHG WKH ,&-¶V FRPSXOVRU\ MXULVGLFWLRQ
since East Timor had been incorporated into Indonesian territory.60 Yet there is 
support for the view that permanent sovereignty over natural resources has 
legally binding consequences in the two dissenting opinions of the judgment. 
These opinions embraced the view that permanent sovereignty is one of the 
essential principles of contemporary international law with erga omnes 
                                                 
 
56
 One hundred and twenty states voted in favour, six states voted against and there were ten 
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5HVRXUFHV¶DERYHQ16, 203; Schrijver, above n 18, 112. 
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Law 1187, 1192. 
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 However, East Timor was also a non-self-governing territory under the administration of 
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negotiated a treaty with Indonesia that created a zone of cooperation in the Timor Gap, 
which forms part of the continental shelf near East Timor: ibid. 
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character.61 Subsequently in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
case,62 the ICJ recognised the potential limitations of applying international  
law in the context of illegal resource exploitation taking place during  
armed conflicts.63 The ICJ has, for the first time, expressly recognised that 
RPSNR has attained the status of customary international law.64 The CRXUW¶V
reasoning ² which relied on the UNGA permanent sovereignty  
resolutions ² has been criticised because UNGA lacks the power to make 
legally binding resolutions.65 
According to some scholars, permanent sovereignty could be regarded as jus 
cogens ² that is, a peremptory norm ² similar to the prohibition on slavery or 
the general prohibition on the use of force, making it unlawful for states to 
derogate from that norm in future agreements.66 Although the main elements of 
the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources have been included 
in several multilateral treaties,67 and have been recognised in international 
arbitral awards,68 it is not clear that one could go as far as to label the principle 
of permanent sovereignty as jus cogens. Nico Schrijver, for example, contends 
WKDWµDWPRVWRne may conclude that some of its core elements such as that of the 
SURKLELWLRQRIDSSURSULDWLRQFDUU\WKLVVWDWXV¶69 In particular, a state should not 
be precluded from entering into an agreement freely in which it accepts a partial 
limitation of the exercise of its sovereignty in respect of certain resources in 
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character. 
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115 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980). 
 
67
 See, eg, ICCPR; ICESCR; African Charter art 21; Vienna Convention on Succession of 
States in Respect of Treaties, opened for signature 23 August 1978, 1946 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 6 November 1996) art 13; Convention on the Law of the Sea art 137; CBD art 3. 
 
68
 See, eg, Texaco (1977) 53 ILR 389, 422. In Texaco, the arbitrator concluded that the RPSNR 
expressed the opinio juris communis on nationalisation of foreign property under 
international law: at 491±2 [71]. See also RPSNR. 
 
69
 Schrijver, above n 18, 221±2. See also Government of Kuwait v American Independent Oil 
Company (Awards) ,/0>@,QWHUQDWLRQDO$UELWUDO7ULEXQDOµAminoil¶ 
14 Melbourne Journal of International Law [Vol 14 
particular areas for a specified and limited period of time.70 Conversely, there is 
support for the view that the jus cogens status has been achieved in light of the 
fact that the principle of permanent sovereignty meets the test of being widely 
accepted and recognised by a very large majority of states.71 
Regardless of whether permanent sovereignty over natural resources is to be 
regarded as a rule of customary international law, an emerging rule or as a 
peremptory norm, it seems clear that it has evolved into a legal form, binding all 
states to respect it as a rule of international law. One of the important 
consequences of this is that, increasingly, natural resource contracts tend to be 
regarded as a temporary alienation of inherent rights which may be called on at 
any time (provided that proper compensation is paid).72 
III THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
The evolution of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources coincides with the consolidation of the right of self-determination of 
peoples. This Part examines the extent to which the right of self-determination is 
an appropriate basis for indigenous communities to secure a degree of autonomy 
and self-government (that is, internal self-determination) and, in more limited 
circumstances, in which it could provide the basis for the indigenous right to 
secession from an oppressive state that fails to address the land and resource 
rights of indigenous communities (in other words, external self-determination). 
A  The Right to External Self-Determination under International Law 
Self-determination allows peoples µthe right, in full freedom, to determine, 
when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without 
external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social 
and cultural development¶.73 It emerged as a principle of international law at the 
San Francisco Conference at which the Charter of the United Nations was 
adopted.74 This culminated in the inclusion of the principle in both arts 1(2) and 
55 of that instrument.75 In addition, an express reference to the right of  
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self-determination is made in art 1 of both the ICCPR and ICESCR.76 However, 
there is no definition in the Charter of the United Nations or in any human rights 
instrument of who the peoples entitled to be beneficiaries of the right to  
self-determination are.77 Yet it appears reasonable to suggest that if  
self-determination in international law is a righW DFFUXLQJ WR µDOO SHRSOHV¶ WKHQ
indigenous peoples can be recognised as beneficiaries of the right. 
Against the so-FDOOHG µEOXH ZDWHU¶ SULQFLSOH ZKLFK UHFRJQLVHV 
self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQRQO\ WR WKRVH WHUULWRULHVFRORQLVHGE\ µIRUHLJQ LQYDGHUV¶78 a 
less restrictive doctrine suggests that the right of self-determination remains 
applicable even after the colonial period.79 This view is supported by the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
µDeclaration on the Granting of Independence¶80 and Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and  
Co-Operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the  
United Nations µDeclaration on International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations¶,81 both of which expand the concept of self-determination beyond 
colonialism. They do this by recognising the right of secession of peoples when 
VWDWHV GR QRW FRQGXFW µWKHPVHOYHV LQ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKH SULQFLSOH RI HTXDO
rights and self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQRISHRSOHV¶82 RUGRQRW µSRVVHVV«DJRYHUQPHQW
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to 
UDFHFUHHGRUFRORXU¶83 
The ICJ was initially reluctant to endorse the principle of self-determination 
beyond its anti-colonialist form, as seen in its 1971 advisory opinion Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
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(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)84 
and in its 1975 advisory opinion Western Sahara.85 Yet in its 2010 advisory 
opinion on the declaration of independence by Kosovo,86 the ICJ has found no 
prohibition on unilateral declarations of independence in either general 
international law or in the practice of the Security Council.87 The ICJ noted that  
[d]uring the second half of the twentieth century, the international law of  
self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence 
for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation.88  
This suggests that territories which are not governed by their own peoples ² and 
populations which are subject to oppression and subjugation by the state ² have 
a right under international law to separate from that state.89 
Therefore in any country where the government adopts a policy of exclusion 
of peoples on grounds of race, creed or colour from political representation, or 
introduces policies that aim at the subjugation or extermination of minority 
groups or indigenous peoples, the right of self-determination arises in its external 
form. Thus the right to external self-determination will depend on the degree to 
which a government is democratically representative and the fundamental rights 
that are available to indigenous peoples. Antonio Cassese and Ian Brownlie 
contended that self-determination is a legal principle which has achieved  
jus cogens status from which states cannot derogate.90 Frederic Kirgis, more 
cautiously, treats it as only attaining this status in its anti-colonialist form.91 
On the other hand, state and judicial practices have in general been reluctant 
to accept a general right to external self-determination. This can be seen in the 
Aaland Islands case,92 in which the Council of the League of Nations rejected 
the right claimed by a vast majority of the population of the Aaland Islands to 
VHFHGHIURP)LQODQGDVLWZRXOGµGHVWUR\RUGHUDQGVWDELOLW\ZLWKLQ>VWDWHV@DQG
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>DOVR@ LQDXJXUDWHDQDUFK\ LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO OLIH¶93 A similar approach was taken 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference Re Secession of Quebec.94 
States have been strenuously opposed to the recognition of a right of  
self-determination for indigenous peoples, fearing that it might give rise to 
claims of independent statehood.95 They have also preferred to refer to 
indigenous µgroups¶ avoiding the term µpeoples¶ RU UHTXLULQJ WKDW WKH µV¶ RI
peoples be dropped), as they believe that this level of recognition could be the 
basis for claims of independence and encourage dismemberment of their 
boundaries.96 They argue that their constitutions do not permit the possibility of 
PRUHWKDQRQHµSHRSOH¶ZLWKLQWKHLUQDWLRQDOWHUULWRU\thus objecting to the term 
µLQGLJHQRXV QDWLRQV¶ RU WKH UHFRJQLWLRQ RI DXWRQRPRXV LQGLJHQRXV OHJDO DQG
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political systems.97 They argue that any ethnic nationalism is dangerous, as it 
does not contribute to inter-ethnic peace and understanding in a society.98 
Yet, thus far, claims for external self-determination and the establishment of 
an independent state has not featured as the main claim in cases brought by 
indigenous peoples before regional human rights bodies. Instead, they have 
GHPDQGHGUHFRJQLWLRQDQGWLWOHIRUWKHLUDQFHVWUDOODQGVDQGµWKHULJKWWRGHFLGH
on the scope and nature of development projects that affect their lands and 
UHVRXUFHV¶(internal self-determination).99 Although, as will be discussed below, 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights µ,QWHU-$PHULFDQ &RXUW¶ and the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have taken a progressive 
approach in many cases towards the recognition of indigenous peoples¶ rights to 
land and natural resources, it has not recognised a full right to  
self-determination.100 Evidence of this is the report of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, which concerned complaints relating to the 
relocation of a large number of the native American Miskito people on the 
Atlantic coast of Nicaragua during the civil war.101 The Commission concluded 
that international law does not recognise a right of the indigenous Miskito 
population to secession and that they were not beneficiaries of  
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self-determination.102 
In light of these recognised constraints, most commentators tend to argue 
against a general right of indigenous peoples to secession, defending instead the 
creation of regimes of autonomy and self-government for indigenous peoples.103 
Erica-Irene Daes goes further to argue that indigenous peoples have no intention 
to segregate completely and create new nation-states.104 She then concludes that 
the right of self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV LQYROYHV µEHlated  
state-EXLOGLQJ¶105 which she defines as a process not of assimilation, but of 
recognition of distinct peoples and their incorporation into the fabric of the state, 
on agreed terms; in particular because indigenous SHRSOHV¶FRQFHSWLRQVof social 
order are often founded upon cultural integrity and kinship (between humans, 
animals, plants and landforms).106 This kinship evolved into a general suspicion 
of the very concept of the nation-state as it has developed in the modern era.107 
Yet, although there is certainly no consensus in the international indigenous 
peoples¶ movement on this issue, it must be noted that some indigenous groups 
KDYH LQGHHGGHPDQGHG WKHFUHDWLRQRI µ,QGLDQ1DWLRQV¶DQG UHVWRUDWLRQRI WKHLU
ancestral rights (which could also be regarded as a way by which they would be 
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able to better organise themselves internationally).108 There are at least some 
legitimate arguments for the right to external self-determination of indigenous 
peoples to be recognised.109 In particular, there is no principled reason why, in 
the circumstances envisaged more generally under either the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence or the Declaration on International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations or elaborated under the ,&-¶V DGYLVRU\ RSLQLRQ Accordance 
with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of the Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo µKosovo Advisory Opinion¶,110 indigenous peoples (like any 
other peoples subject to oppression and subjugation by a state) could not be 
considered beneficiaries of self-determination in its external form. The kind of 
violations RILQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶ULJKWVWKDWDUJXDEO\FRXOGJLYHULVHWRDULJKWWR
external self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQDUHQRWLQWKHDXWKRUV¶YLHZWKHLQMXVWLFHVWKDWWKH\
have suffered in the past but, rather, the more immediate oppression and 
VXEMXJDWLRQWKDWVRPHLQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶JURXSVVXIIHUtoday.111 
Given the constraints on recognising a right of indigenous peoples to secede 
from a state, it is the right to internal self-determination which is realistically 
more achievable for indigenous peoples. It provides a legitimate legal basis to 
dispute the undue interference with and invasion of their lands by economic 
operators in the natural resources sector, who often act with the implicit or 
explicit consent of national authorities. 
B ,QGLJHQRXV3HRSOHV¶5LJKWWR,QWHUQDO6HOI-Determination 
James Anaya, presently the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous People, 
notes that governments have increasingly moved away from the tendency to 
HTXDWH WKH ZRUG µVHOI-determination¶ ZLWK DQ DEVROXWH ULJKW WR IRUP DQ
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The Rights of Peoples (Oxford University Press, 1988) 107, 120. 
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(Policy Statement, 24 January 1983). 
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independent state.112 He cites the example of the Australian government which, 
in a statement to the 1991 session of the UN Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations, put forward the view that self-determination must be considered 
broadly ² not only as the attainment of independent statehood but as the 
assertion of identity, language, cultures, tradition, self-management and 
autonomy.113 Therefore, if external self-determination is not realistically 
available or politically feasible, it is possible to argue that another form of  
self-determination can be a substitute for its external application.114 The  
81 +XPDQ 5LJKWV &RPPLWWHH µ+5&¶ coined WKH WHUP µLQWHUQDO 
self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶,115 which is now a term used by most authors when referring 
to forms of self-government, autonomy, territorial integrity or exclusive 
enjoyment of indigenous lands and resources. 
µSelf-government¶ refers to µthe overarching political dimension of ongoing  
self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶116 Values such as democracy and cultural and political 
pluralism have reinforced the claims of indigenous groups for governmental and 
administrative autonomy for their communities.117 The principle of  
subsidiarity ² the idea that decisions should be made at the most local level 
possible ² is employed in many Western societies and reinforces the view that 
indigenous communities should be able to maintain their traditional decentralised 
systems of governance and to gain access, control and the sharing of benefits 
over natural resources in their territory.118 Indigenous peoples should maintain 
their own institutions of governance, which includes their customary and written 
law, as well as dispute resolution and adjudication mechanisms that have existed 
not only de facto, but also de jure, as recognised in arts 6 and 7 of ILO 
Convention No 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples µILO Convention 
169¶119 
The right to internal self-determination of indigenous peoples is at the heart of 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
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µUNDRIP¶120 adopted by the UNGA on 13 September 2007 following  
20 years of difficult negotiations.121 The UNDRIP states that 
[i]ndigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right 
to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local 
affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.122 
Although resolutions of the UNGA are not legally binding, in this case the 
UNDRIP was adopted by so many states with so few objections and abstentions 
that it might very well attain the status of customary international law.123 Indeed, 
a number of indigenous rights enshrined in the UNDRIP have been recognised as 
having evolved into customary law. For example, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights argued in Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
Community v Nicaragua (µAwas Tingni¶124 WKDW µWKHUH LV DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
customary law norm which affirms the rights of indigenous peoples to their 
WUDGLWLRQDO ODQGV¶125 The fact that Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
United States originally withheld their support for the UNDRIP suggests that it 
lacks the solid status necessary for the formation of customary international law 
and, even if it were considered as such, that those states might not be bound by 
it DV WKH\FRXOGEH UHJDUGHGDV µSHUVLVWHQWREMHFWRUV¶. Moreover, because these 
four countries host important and representative groups from among WKHZRUOG¶V
indigenous peoples,126 it was suggested that the UNDRIP might not reach the 
status of customary international law.127 However, since those four countries 
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have subsequently endorsed the UNDRIP, their (non-) participation is no longer 
considered a barrier to the consolidation of indigenous customary law rights 
under the UNDRIP.128 Still, the better view appears to be that although it may not 
represent customary international law, a number of rights enunciated in  
it ² including those to land and natural resource rights ² already form part of 
customary international law.129 
Therefore, autonomous governance is not only instrumental but also 
necessary for indigenous peoples to control the development of their distinctive 
cultures, including the use of land and resources against undue interference by 
powerful economic interests or government.  
The next Part examLQHVRQHIXQGDPHQWDODVSHFWRIWKHWUDQVSRVLWLRQRIVWDWHV¶
obligations under international law giving effect to the right to internal self-
determination; in particular, the extent to which the rights to property and natural 
resources of indigenous peoples are established in international law. 
IV INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES¶ LAND AND NATURAL 
RESOURCE RIGHTS 
Some indigenous communities tend to view their rights as being more than a 
mere share in the proceeds arising from the exploration and exploitation of 
natural resources and claim additionally the right to control and manage natural 
resources located in their land.130 µ6RFLDO SURSHUW\¶ PRGHOV RI QDWXUDO UHVRXUFH
ownership establish stewardship models of holding, in which public and 
community interests are of paramount importance.131 One of the distinguishing 
features separating minorities in general and indigenous peoples includes the 
indigenous claim to have collective property rights to land and natural resources, 
as well as their historical association with the environment ² not to mention 
their specific request for some degree of autonomy and self-determination.132 
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Historically, uti possidetis juris133 has been raised as a legal basis for the 
expropriation of indigenous lands, based primarily on concepts of effective 
occupation of land.134 
7KH PDLQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO DJUHHPHQW UHFRJQLVLQJ LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ ULJKWV WR
land and natural resources currently in force is ILO Convention 169.135 It 
provides for the recognition of indigenous land tenure systems, which are 
typically based on customary rules. Article 14(1) of ILO Convention 169 affirms 
WKDW µWKH ULJKWV RI RZQHUVKLS DQG SRVVHVVLRQ RI >LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV@ RYHU WKH
lands whLFKWKH\WUDGLWLRQDOO\RFFXS\VKDOOEHUHFRJQLVHG¶DQGWKDW 
measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples 
concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have 
traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities. 
Under ILO Convention 169, indigenous land and resource rights are of a 
collective character and they include a combination of possessive use and 
management rights. 
7KHLQGLYLGXDODQGSHRSOHV¶ULJKWVWRQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVDUHDOVRUHFRJQLsed in 
regional human rights treaties. Under the African Charter RQ +XPDQ 3HRSOHV¶
Rights µAfrican Charter¶136 and the American Convention, the collective rights 
of indigenous peoples to land and natural resources are recognised.137 As will be 
discussed in Part V below, this has allowed for the development of a substantial 
body of international jurisprudence recognising the rights of indigenous peoples 
to natural resources. 
The adoption of the UNDRIP in 2007 marked another significant 
development towards the recognition of the indigenous rights to land and natural 
resources. Specifically, it recognises the indigenous rights not to be subjected to 
forced assimilation or destruction of their culture,138 not to be forcibly removed 
from their lands or territories and not to be relocated without their free, prior and 
informed consent.139 It similarly ensures the conservation and protection of the 
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environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and 
resources,140 as well as the right to redress by means that can include restitution 
or (when this is not possible) just, fair and equitable compensation for lands, 
territories and resources which have been µconfiscated, taken, occupied, used or 
damaged¶.141 The UNDRIP also recognises the indigenous µright to determine 
and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or 
territories and other resources¶.142 
In addition to the well-documented difficulties experienced by indigenous 
peoples in having their land rights recognised, their natural resource claims often 
clash with those of the state and other economic actors. The legal challenges 
surrounding this are particularly evident in the case of subsoil natural resources. 
In most legal systems, ownership over subsoil natural resources such as oil and 
gas is vested in the state.143 The origins of this property rights regime can be 
traced back to the regalian regime, later integrated into the domanial system, 
under which ownership of natural resources is vested in the sovereign.144 So 
while the state vests in itself mineral resources, the landowners only have a right 
of compensation for the loss of surface rights.145 States that apply the domanial 
regime tend to explicitly spell out in their constitutions and legislation their 
sovereignty and control over oil and gas resources.146 
ILO Convention 169 falls short RI H[SOLFLWO\ XSKROGLQJ LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶
rights to mineral or other sub-surface resources and hence does not condemn the  
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practice of states that retain for themselves the ownership of those resources.147 
Yet, given that under general international law the unilateral expropriation of 
surface rights is generally prohibited, the same argument logically appears to 
DSSO\LQWKHFDVHRIDVWDWH¶VFRQFHVVLRQIRU the extraction of subsoil resources in 
indigenous lands.148 The Constitutional Court of South Africa, for example, has 
held that under indigenous law and by virtue of traditional occupation and use, 
ownership of subsoil and minerals may vest collectively in indigenous 
peoples.149 
A Indigenous Peoples¶ Right to Prior and Informed Consent and 
Participation in Decision-Making 
It is a generally accepted principle in international law that indigenous 
peoples should be consulted in the event that decisions made by national 
authorities and others could affect them.150 The right to consultation is enshrined 
in ILO Convention 169, which employs different standards ranging from 
consultation to participation and, in the case of relocation, informed consent.151 
For example, according WR DUW  FRQVXOWDWLRQ PXVW EH XQGHUWDNHQ µLQ JRRG
faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of 
DFKLHYLQJ DJUHHPHQW RU FRQVHQW¶ Furthermore, states must also guarantee the 
SURWHFWLRQ RI LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ ULJKWV WR QDWXUDO UHVRXUFHV WKURXJKRXW WKHLU
WHUULWRULHV LQFOXGLQJ WKHLU ULJKW µWR SDUWLFLSDWH LQ WKH XVH management and 
conservation of [those] resources¶.152 Participation at the broadest level of 
governance (including in national parliamentary debates) must not supplant local 
participation in connection with specific projects.153 The UNDRIP also 
recognises the right of indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making in 
matters that could impact their rights ² through representatives chosen by them 
in accordance with their own procedures ² as well as the right to maintain and 
                                                 
 
147
 ILO Convention 169 states, in art 15(2), that  
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undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such 
resources pertaining to their lands. 
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 Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community [2004] 5 SA 460 (Constitutional Court of South 
Africa) 64. 
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 ILO Convention 169 art 15(1). 
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 %DUWRORPp&ODYHURµ7KH,QGLJHQRXV5LJKWVRI3DUWLFLSDWLRQDQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO'HYHORSPHQW
3ROLFLHV¶   Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 41, 49. This 
implies that national procedures regarding project approval and development ² such as 
environmental impact assessment and strategic impact assessment ² must recognise 
LQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶ right to consultation.  
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develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.154 States shall 
consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior 
and informed consent155 before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them.156 It is thus recognised in both 
ILO Convention 169 and the UNDRIP that consultation is an obligation when 
indigenRXVSHRSOHV¶ODQGDQGUHVRXUFH imperatives are concerned.157 In this vein, 
Anaya argues WKDW WKH µZLGHVSUHDG DFFHSWDQFH RI WKH QRUP RI FRQVXOWDWLRQ
GHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWLWKDVEHFRPHSDUWRIFXVWRPDU\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶158 
The extent of this duty of consultation has been intensely debated. In 
particular, it is contended that the right of indigenous peoples to participate must 
include the right to veto decisions affecting them.159 ILO Convention 169 
generally falls short of requiring the consent of indigenous peoples, instead 
requiring merely that consultations are carried out and the right to participate in 
decision-making is respected.160 The exception is the case of relocation, which 
can only take place as an exceptional measure and requires free and informed 
consent.161 Other provisions, although not establishing a legal requirement that  
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 UNDRIP, UN Doc A/RES/61/295, annex art 18. 
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 %DUWRORPp&ODYHURµ7KH,QGLJHQRXV5LJKWVRI3DUticipation and International Development 
3ROLFLHV¶   Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 41, 42. Free, 
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indigenRXVSHRSOHVDQGFRPPXQLWLHV¶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µ)UHH¶VKRXOGLQYROYHQR
FRHUFLRQ LQWLPLGDWLRQ RU PDQLSXODWLRQ DQG µSULRU¶ VKRXOG UHTXLUH WKDW FRQVHQW KDV EHHQ
sought sufficiently in advance of any authorisation or commencement of activities and time 
requirements of indigenous consultation/consensus processes respected µ,QIRUPHG¶ VKRXOG
require that information is provided that includes (but is not limited to) the following 
aspects: the nature, size, pace and scope of any proposed project or activity as well as the 
reasons for the project or activity and the duration. It also includes the localities affected and 
a preliminary assessment of the likely economic, social, cultural and environmental impact, 
including potential risks and fair and equitable benefit-sharing: at 55±6. See also Margaret 
6DWWHUWKZDLWHDQG'HHQD+XUZLW]µ7KH5LJKWRI,QGLJHQRXV3HRSOHVWR0HDQLQJIXO&RQVHQW
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  Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 1. 
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 UNDRIP, UN Doc A/RES/61/295, annex art 19. 
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 $QD\Dµ,QGLJHQRXV3HRSOHV¶3DUWLFLSDWRU\5LJKWV¶DERYHQ147, 10±12. 
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 Ibid 7. 
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 See, eg, ILO Convention 169 art 15(2). As discussed in Part IV above, ILO Convention 169 
falls short of upholding rights to mineral or sub-surface resources in cases where the state 
generally retains ownership of those resources. On the other hand, the Convention requires 
that indigenous peoples are to be consulted in any resource exploration or extraction on their 
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 ILO Convention 169 art 16(2). 
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consent be obtained, could be read broadly as requiring an element of 
participation (and arguably also consent) by indigenous peoples.162 
The UNDRIP DOVRLQFRUSRUDWHVWKHREOLJDWLRQRIµSULRUDQGLQIRUPHGFRQVHQW¶
calling on states to prohibit forcible removal of indigenous peoples from their 
ODQGVDQGGHFODULQJ WKDW µ[n]o relocation shall take place without the free, prior 
DQG LQIRUPHG FRQVHQW RI WKH LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV FRQFHUQHG¶163 It also 
incorporates the right to participation in decision-making in matters which would 
affect their rights,164 before the adoption and implementation of legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them.165 
Therefore, the state duty to give effect to the indigenous right to prior and 
informed consent is largely dependent on the nature of the substantive rights 
concerned. In certain areas, such as the use of traditional knowledge,166 
resettlement and certain development-related activities affecting indigenous 
SHRSOHV¶ WUDGLWLRQDO ODQGV LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ UHTXLUHV QRW RQO\ WKDW indigenous 
SHRSOHV¶ right to consultation is followed, but also establishes that they have the 
right to give or withhold their consent.167 The duty to obtain this consent, at least 
in the cases involving relocation or removal of indigenous peoples from their 
lands (in the absence of which, special procedures for relocation must take place) 
appears to have evolved into customary international law.168 It has gradually 
been evolving towards WKHUHFRJQLWLRQRILQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶ULJKWWRIUHHSULRU
and informed consent in relation to specific fundamental rights under 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ 6LQFH LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ XQGHUO\LQJ LQWHUHVWV DUH
significantly different in each circumstance, it is expected that the nature and 
extent of consultations required would also differ.169 
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ml>. See also MacKay, above n 147, 52; Satterthwaite and Hurwitz, above n 155, 3; 
Clavero, above n 155, 41. 
 
169
 $QD\Dµ,QGLJHQRXV3HRSOHV¶ 3DUWLFLSDWRU\5LJKWV¶DERYHQ147, 7. 
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The right of indigenous peoples to consent to the development of extractable 
resources located in their lands is hotly contested by those in the extractive 
industries and governments:170 
At the heart of the debate are disagreements about the extent of tribal and 
community self-determination and state sovereignty, the legitimacy of ad-hoc 
µSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶ VFKHPHV LQLWLDWHG E\ LQGXVWU\ DQG JRYHUQPHQWV, and the role of 
human rights law in solving such disputes.171 
Anaya argues that international law is developing to require consent by 
indigenous peoples where their property rights are affected by natural resource 
extraction: 
Where property rights are indirectly but still significantly affected, for example in 
the extraction of subsoil resources that are deemed to be under state ownership, 
WKHVWDWH¶VFRQVXOWDWLRQVZLWKLQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHVPXVWDWOHDVWKDYHWKHREMHFWLYH
of achieving consent. If consent is not achieved, there is a strong presumption that 
WKH SURMHFW VKRXOG QRW JR IRUZDUG « DQG « >WKDW@ WKH VWDWH PXVW VKRw that 
indigenous concerns were heard and accommodated, though without the heavy 
burden of mitigation that exists where property rights are at issue.172 
This is recognised in the UNDRIP, which refers specifically to the need to 
obtain the prior, free and informed consent of indigenous peoples in the context 
of extractive projects in their territories.173 $QD\D¶VDUJXPHQWalso finds support 
in the implementation of the duty of free, prior and informed consent under the 
law in some countries, including the law applying to mining in, for example, the 
Northern Territory under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 
1976 (Cth).174 The many barriers to implementation of the right to prior and 
informed consent in national legislation include inadequacy of laws and 
regulations, lack of articulated community procedures and the lack of desire to 
facilitate access by some local communities.175 
B Access and Sharing of Benefits over the Exploitation of Genetic and 
Forestry Resources 
Both ILO Convention 169 and the UNDRIP deal inadequately with the 
sharing of benefits that arise from the exploration and exploitation of the natural 
resources found on indigenous lands. The only provision of ILO Convention 169 
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obtained through statutory, indigenous-controlled Land Councils, which may withhold 
consent to a mining rights license unless they are satisfied that the traditional Aboriginal 
owners of the land understand the nature of the activity and are able to consent as a group: 
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dealing with this issue is art 15(2)ZKLFKVWDWHVWKDWµWKHSHoples concerned shall 
wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall receive 
fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of such 
DFWLYLWLHV¶$OWKRXJK LW LV QRW XQFRPPRQ IRU LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUHDWLHV WRXVe vague 
language to allow for flexible implementation by states parties (this is 
particularly so in the case of so-FDOOHG µIUDPHZRUN-WUHDWLHV¶,176 it is 
disappointing that the main legally-binding international instrument on 
LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ ULJKWV GRHV not deal satisfactorily with the question of 
benefit-sharing. The UNDRIP is even more deficient from this perspective as it 
does not contain any legal provisions on the sharing of benefits from resources 
found on indigenous lands.177 
More elaborate international norms relating to access and benefit-sharing are 
found in biodiversity-related international environmental agreements. The 
Convention on Biological Diversity µCBD¶178 requires that free, prior and 
informed consent be obtained from contracting parties providing access to 
genetic resources.179 Although one of the main objectives of the CBD is to 
facilitate access to genetic resources, it does not require biodiversity-rich host 
states to allow foreign nationals access to genetic resources. Article 15(4) 
authorises states to limit or place conditions on access to genetic resources and 
VWDWHVWKDWµDFFHVVZKHUHJUDQWHGVKDOOEHRQPXWXDOO\DJUHHGWHUPV¶ 
,Q DGGLWLRQ SDUWLHV PXVW µUHVSHFW SUHVHUYH DQG PDLQWDLQ NQRZOHGJH
innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities « and promote 
their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such 
NQRZOHGJH¶,180 \HW RQO\ µDV IDU DV SRVVLEOH DQG DV DSSURSULDWH¶181 DQG µVXEMHFW 
WR « QDWLRQDO OHJLVODWLRQ¶182 However, the CBD does not clarify how the 
benefits arising from exploration and exploitation of genetic resources are to be 
shared, only stating that benefit-sharing LV µIDLU DQGHTXLWDEOH¶ DQG WKDW VKDULQJ
IURP µUHVXOWV RI UHVHDUFK DQG GHYHORSPHQW DQG « FRPPHUFLDO DQG RWKHU
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utilizatiRQRIJHQHWLFUHVRXUFHV«[must take place on PXWXDOO\DJUHHGWHUPV¶183 
The parties thus recognised the need to further harmonise national laws by 
adopting the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising Out of their Utilization  
µBonn Guidelines¶184 ² voluntary guidelines setting the obligations and rights 
of parties with respect to genetic resources and traditional knowledge185 ² and 
the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing µNagoya Protocol¶)186 
(which is, however, not yet in force).187 The Nagoya Protocol, if adopted and 
implemented by the states that ratify it, will provide further (albeit limited) 
guidance on the implementation of the CBD provisions on access and  
benefit-sharing.188 But, perhaps more significantly, the Nagoya Protocol would 
go some way towards protecting indigenous traditional knowledge, which is 
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Bjarne Gabrielsen and Steven M Ferguson, 1DWXUH¶V0HGLFLQHV7UDGLWLRQDO.QRZOHGJHDQG
Intellectual Property Management. Case Studies from the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), USA (8 September 2009) National Institutes of Health <http://www.ncbi. 
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2739453/>. Also see the agreement between the state-owned 
&RXQFLO RI 6FLHQWLILF 5HVHDUFK µ&6,5¶ DQG WKH 6DQ 3HRSOH RI 1DPLELD UHJDUGLQJ WKH
exploitation of Hoodia, which requires CSIR to share with the San People a portion of the 
royalties from potential drug sales.  
The monetary benefits are 8 per cent of milestone payments received by CSIR from 
Phytopharm during the product development period and 6 per cent of the royalty 
income received by CSIR from Phytopharm as a result of the successful exploitation 
of prRGXFWV DULVLQJ IURP WKH SDWHQW¶V OLFHQVLQJ LQFRPH RU VDOHV DQ\ZKHUH LQ WKH
world. 
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Institute of Advanced Studies <http://www.unutki.org/news.php?news_id=165&doc_id=39 
&mode=archive>. 
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currently insufficiently protected in international intellectual property law 
instruments.189 Article 5(5) of the Nagoya Protocol provides that  
[e]ach party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as 
appropriate, in order that the benefits arising from the utilization of traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources are shared in a fair and equitable 
way with indigenous and local communities holding such knowledge.190 
This is qualified by the caveat under art 5(2) of the Nagoya Protocol, which 
requires that the benefit-sharing regime be µin accordance with domestic 
legislation regarding the established rights of these indigenous and local 
communities over these genetic resources¶191 It leaves considerable discretion to 
parties with regards to the implementation of access and benefit-sharing 
provisions. Either nationally implemented legislative measures or policy 
documents would satisfy these provisions. Although art 5(4) and the Nagoya 
Protocol¶V annex provide some guidance on the types of monetary and  
non-monetary benefits that could accrue from the exploration and exploitation of 
genetic resources,192 the Nagoya Protocol, like the CBD, leaves considerable for 
discretion to the parties in negotiating the terms of any agreement, which 
(according to the Nagoya ProtocolVKDOOEHµXSRQPXWXDOO\DJUHHGWHUPV¶193  
6WDWHV¶ ZLOOLQJQHVV WR QHJRWLDWH LQWHUQDWLRQDO VWDQGDUGV in relation to access 
and benefit-sharing may be further tested in the context of Reduced Emissions 
IURP'HIRUHVWDWLRQDQG)RUHVW'HJUDGDWLRQµ5(''¶SURMHFWV$OWKRXJKDW WKH
time of writing a legally binding international agreement on REDD has not been 
adopted,194 the World Bank (which is expected to play a significant role in 
REDD-financing projects) has adopted guidelines for the participation of 
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indigenous peoples in REDD projects.195 One significant shortcoming of the 
World Bank guidelines, however, is that they do not clarify how the economic 
benefits arising from REDD projects are to be shared by local and indigenous 
communities. 
It could be argued that the traditional culture of many indigenous societies is 
antithetical to the very idea of economic progress and development, as generally 
understood by the dominant society.196 This concept of economic development is 
the driving force behind the commercial exploitation of natural resources, but it 
also underlies the recognition of intellectual property rights for indigenous 
peoples, which would yield important revenue. There are a number of initiatives 
and proposals under consideration or already adopted ² including the 
establishment of revenue distribution agreements or funds linked to projects for 
conservatioQRILQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶ODQGVDQGQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHV² which could 
implement a benefit-VKDULQJUHJLPHZLWKRXWFRPSURPLVLQJ LQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶
traditional culture and lifestyle.197 
So far there has been only a timid attempt by states to adopt binding 
international standards relating to access and benefit-sharing arising from 
commercial exploration and exploitation of natural resources. These have been 
adopted almost exclusively in the context of international environmental treaties 
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and soft law guidelines. They leave a large margin of appreciation to states as 
regards decisions to grant access to genetic resources and the implementation of 
the benefit-sharing regimes. The existing attempts to regulate access and  
benefit-sharing largely preserve the principle of state sovereignty over natural 
resources. 
V INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL JUDICIAL AVENUES FOR THE ASSERTION OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES¶ LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCE RIGHTS 
The substantive norms discussed in the previous sections could be easily 
disregarded by states if there were no effective legal and extra-judicial 
mechanisms for enforcement and dispute settlement in place. This Part examines 
the judicial avenues that are available internationally and regionally for the 
DVVHUWLRQ RI LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ ODQG DQG QDtural resource rights. It also 
examines the judicial avenues for challenging government policies and the 
actions by economic operators that infringe upon those rights. The enforceability 
of these norms is an essential prerequisite for peoples to effectively exercise 
resource rights. 
A The International Court of Justice 
The ICJ is not a particularly suitable forum for the assertion of indigenous 
peoples¶ rights, given that its jurisdiction is limited to adjudication of disputes 
between states.198 In the few disputes where the ICJ has had the opportunity to 
discuss the issue of LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ ULJKWs to land, it has not taken a 
particularly progressive stance.199 In the Western Sahara advisory opinion,200 the 
ICJ recognised the invalidity of the titles of acquisition (including the doctrines 
of discovery, conquest and terra nullius) used by Western states for claiming 
their sovereignty over indigenous traditional lands. However, the ICJ has not 
recognised the validity of indigenous traditional land tenure systems as such.201 
According to the ICJ, at the time of the colonisation of Western Sahara by Spain, 
such territory was not terra nullius, since it µwas inhabited by peoples which, if 
nomadic, were socially and politically organized in tribes and under chiefs 
competHQW WR UHSUHVHQW WKHP¶202 Nevertheless, the ICJ appeared to place more 
weight on the European notion of acquisition of title than non-European 
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(including indigenous) conceptions of land tenure.203 Therefore, indigenous 
claims to title which fall outside this European-oriented criterion of land  
tenure ² such as their claim of political organisation in their territory or 
consciousness of possession ² are unlikely to be recognised as legally relevant. 
Another case in which a similarly narrow interpretation was applied by the 
ICJ to indigenous land rights involved a dispute over six land boundary lines 
between El Salvador and Honduras. In the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute case,204 the ICJ held that 
[i]t was the administrative boundaries between the Spanish colonial 
administrative units, not the boundaries between the Indian settlements as such, 
that were transformed, by the operation of the uti possidetis juris, into 
international boundaries in 1821.205 
This narrow interpretation of the law by the ICJ has been vehemently criticised 
by Michael Reisman, who argues that the position of the ICJ reflects a 
personal detachment and disengagement of judicial responsibility, not from past 
tragedies that may be irreparable, but from the contemporary, continuing tragedy 
of indigenous peoples caused by the inertial, and apparently unthinking, 
application of anachronistic law.206 
States generally refrain from instituting proceedings before the ICJ in 
contentious disputes as an exercise of general enforcement or policing powers 
towards other states207 ² for example, in order to ensure that other states 
comply with international law, but without a more immediate or specific interest 
of that state being affected by the non-compliance of the other state.208 So it 
appears unlikely that states will bring proceedings before the ICJ to ensure that 
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other states give effect to their duty to protect the rights of their own indigenous 
peoples as recognised under international law.209 Moreover, the jurisdiction of 
the ICJ is, as a rule, consensual. The ICJ only has compulsory jurisdiction if the 
parties to the dispute have accepted this type of jurisdiction of the court.210 
Therefore, the role of the ICJ in developing the international jurisprudence on 
LQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶ULJKWVLVOLNHO\WRUHPDin limited. An indication of this is the 
fact that the ICJ rulings discussed in this section have focused on land 
boundaries disputes ² being disputes with trans-boundary implications ² and 
QRWDVVXFKRQDVWDWH¶VGXW\WRSURWHFWLQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶ULJKWs.  
B ,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQ5LJKWV7UHDWLHV¶0RQLWRULQJ%RGLHV 
The compliance and monitoring bodies established under specific 
international human rights treaties are some of the main international avenues 
WKURXJKZKLFKYLRODWLRQVRILQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶ODQGDnd natural resource rights 
can be asserted. 
The HRC, which can receive submissions of non-states parties alleging 
violations of the ICCPR, has continued to favour an interpretation of art 27 of the 
ICCPR that includes strong indigenous land, cultural and language rights.211 So 
although it does not provide protection per se IRU LQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶ ULJKWV WR
land, the HRC has extended the scope of art 27 to include essential parts of 
indigenous culture. Therefore, activities relating to the use of the land are to be 
recognised as constituting an essential element of indigenous culture.212 
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As regards the duty to consult indigenous peoples in the context of extractive 
activities, the HRC has considered multiple cases of alleged violations by 
Finland of art 27 of the ICCPR against Sami cultural rights, which involved the 
logging and quarrying of Sami reindeer herding areas by private companies, 
activity that was permitted under Finnish law.213 Although Sami advisory bodies 
had been consulted and changes to the licenses had been made, certain Sami 
constituencies continued to oppose the logging and quarrying.214 On the basis 
that consultation had taken place, as well as the limited nature of the resource 
extraction, the HRC found that the ICCPR had not been violated. 
In a similar vein, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
µ81&(6&5¶KDVXSKHOGLQGLJHQRXVQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHULJKWVE\LQWHUSUHWLQJWKH
ICESCR broadly,QRQHLQVWDQFH81&(6&5QRWHGWKDWµWKHWUDGLWLRQDOODQGVRI
indigenous peoples have been reduced or occupied, without their consent, by 
timber, mining and oil companies, at the expense of the exercise of their culture 
DQGWKHHTXLOLEULXPRIWKHHFRV\VWHP¶215 It has recommended that states µHQVXUH
the participation of indigenous peoples in decisionVDIIHFWLQJWKHLU OLYHV¶216 and 
required states parties to consult and seek the consent of the indigenous peoples 
concerned.217 
Similarly, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
µ&(5'¶ KDV DOVR LQWHQVLILHG LWV PRQLWRULQJ RI LQGLJHQRXV LVVXes and has 
encouraged many states to review their policies concerning indigenous 
peoples.218 It has employed WKHµ8UJHQW$FWLRQ3URFHGXUH¶LQRUGHUWRDGGUHVVWKH
discriminatory policies of some states.219 It has also supported the duty of 
consultation of indigenous peoples when extractive projects have the potential to 
affect them.220 
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C The ILO Compliance Committee 
One of the most significant developments in the field of international law has 
been the emergence of non-compliance procedures under various multilateral 
treaties.221 For example, parties to ILO Convention 169 are required to report on 
measures taken to ensure its implementation and on any problems encountered to 
the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
5HFRPPHQGDWLRQVµ&RPSOLDQFH&RPPLWWHH¶7KH&RPSOLDQFH&RPPLWWHHPD\
take specific action against non-compliance and has the power to submit 
µREVHUYDWLRQV¶ DQG PDNH µGLUHFW UHTXHVWV¶.222 However, its powers to impose 
sanctions for non-compliance are more limited.223 The right to public 
participation, which is envisaged in art 24 of the Constitution of the International 
Labour Organization, allows individuals and organisations to make 
representations when a party fails to comply with ILO Convention 169.224 
The Compliance Committee has recognised that consultations must be held 
ZKHQ LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ LQWHUHVWV DUH LQYROYHG LQFOXGLQJ LQ FDVHV LQYROYLQJ
disputes over land and natural resources.225 For example, in a complaint 
concerning the Embera Katio people of Colombia, the Compliance Committee 
found that despite a consultative process that had led to an agreement with the 
indigenous populations concerning the flooding of their lands for a hydroelectric 
project, the duty to consult had not been fully complied with due to 
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modifications to the project undertaken after the agreement.226 In another case, 
this time involving an oil exploration concession in Ecuador and Colombia,227 
the Compliance Committee found that the concessions had been granted with 
little consultation with the indigenous peoples concerned.228 The Compliance 
Committee upheld the ORFDO LQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶ right to consent when surface 
resources are at stake. Furthermore, it employed art 6(2) of ILO Convention 169 
to make clear that consultations must be in good faith, through culturally 
appropriate procedures and with the objective of reaching an agreement with the 
affected indigenous peoples.229 
D Regional Human Rights Treaties 
Regional human rights bodies, in particular in the Americas, have been 
V\PSDWKHWLFWRLQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶ODQGDQG natural resource rights. Some of the 
most prominent regional developments are the decisions of the inter-American 
human rights bodies,230 which have in general taken a progressive stance on 
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LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ ODQG ULJKWV231 For example, in Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous 
Community v Paraguay µSawhoyamaxa¶232 the Inter-American Court ruled that 
Paraguayan legislation failed to provide an effective judicial remedy that 
protected legitimate land claims laid by indigenous communities.233 This 
constituted a violation, per se, of the American Convention234 and the 
GLVSODFHPHQWDQGH[SURSULDWLRQRILQGLJHQRXV¶ODQGVDPRXQWHGWRDYLRODWLRQRI
the right to life.235 In Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay,236 the  
Inter-American Court considered that the members of the community were 
empowered, even under domestic law, to file claims regarding traditional 
lands.237 The Inter-American Court took this further in Sawhoyamaxa when it 
µordered the State, as a measure of reparation, to individualize those lands and 
transfer them on a for no consideration basis¶.238 It also held that  
>W@KHPHPEHUVRILQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHVZKRKDYHXQZLOOLQJO\ORVWSRVVHVVLRQ«DUH
entitled to restitution thereof or to obtain other lands of equal extension and 
quality. Consequently, possession is not a requisite conditioning the existence of 
indigenous land restitution rights.239  
A similar approach was taken by the Inter-American Court in Moiwana 
Community v Suriname,240 where the Court considered that the members of the 
1¶GMXND SHRSOH ZHUH WKH µOHJLWLPDWH RZQHUV RI WKHLU WUDGLWLRQDO ODQGV¶241 
although they did not have possession of them, due to acts of violence against 
them that had driven them away.242 The Inter-American Court also held that 
traditional possession of lands by indigenous peoples has the equivalent  
legal effect as state-granted full property title,243 undermining claims  
that the customary mechanisms of land title used by indigenous peoples held  
less legal weight than European-oriented conceptions. Importantly, in  
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Saramaka People v Suriname,244 the Inter-American Court referred for the first 
time to the right of self-determination in its interpretation of indigenous land and 
resource rights recognised in art 21 of the American Convention.245 
The Inter-American Court takes the view that states have both positive and 
negative obligations in respecting the right to life. For example, in 
Sawhoyamaxa,246 it gave an expansive interpretation of art 4 of the American 
Convention. It UHFRJQLVHG LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ FROOHFWLYH ULJKWV over land and 
resources and made the following observation: 
In order for this positive obligation to arise, it must be determined that at the 
moment of the occurrence of the events, the authorities knew or should have 
known about the existence of a situation posing an immediate and certain risk to 
the life of an individual or of a group of individuals, and that the necessary 
measures were not adopted within the scope of their authority which could be 
reasonably expected to prevent or avoid such risk.247 
It is thus well-established that failure by a state to provide effective protection 
against threats to indigenous populations ² including their lands ² can lead to 
the liability on the part of the state. This brings disputes over natural resources 
between indigenous peoples and economic operators onto the international plane. 
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also considers that 
possession of land should suffice for indigenous communities otherwise lacking 
real title to the land in order to obtain official recognition of property rights for 
consequent registration.248 The Inter-American Court has also accepted that the 
human right to property embraces the communal property regimes of indigenous 
SHRSOHVDVGHILQHGE\ WKHLURZQFXVWRPVDQG WUDGLWLRQVDQG WKDW µSRVVHVVLRQRI
the land should suffice for indigenous communities lacking real title to property 
RIWKHODQGWRREWDLQRIILFLDOUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKDWSURSHUW\¶249 
As regards the indigenous right to consultation and prior and informed 
consent, the inter-American bodies have articulated a duty for states to obtain the 
consent of indigenous peoples when actions would affect indigenous property 
rights.250 The Inter-American Court has found that such a duty exist on the basis 
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of traditional land tenure.251 Furthermore, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, in Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo  
District v Belize,252 dealing with Mayan land rights in their traditional territories 
in the south of Belize, found WKDW WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VJUDQWRI WKHRLOH[SORUDWLRQ
and logging concessLRQVµZLWKRXWHIIHFWLYHFRQVXOWDWLRQVZLWKDQGWKHLQIRUPHG
FRQVHQW RI WKH 0D\D SHRSOH¶253 constituted a violation of human rights 
guarantees under the American Convention DQG WKDW LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ ODQG
and resource rights under international law are independent of domestic law.254 
In Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, the Inter-American Court received 
evidence from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights which 
concluded that WKH VWDWH µLV DFWLYHO\ UHVSRQVLEOH IRU YLRODWLRQV RI WKH ULJKW WR
property « by granting a concession « without the consent of the Awas Tingni 
LQGLJHQRXVFRPPXQLW\¶255 Thus the Inter-American Court has articulated a link 
between the right to consultation and full and informed consent and protection of 
LQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶SURSHUW\ULghts. 
In the more recent decision of Kichwa Indigenous People of  
Sarayaku v Ecuador,256 the Court assessed whether Ecuador had violated the 
property rights of the Kichwa people of Sarayaku by awarding a private 
company an oil exploration and exploitation concession which partially covered 
ancestral lands, without a consultation process or their free, prior and informed 
consent. The Inter-American Court found that Ecuador had violated art 21 of the 
American Convention,257 although it did not elaborate further on the obligations 
to consult and to obtain consent in the context of large-scale extractive industry 
projects that impact on indigenous territories.258 
Within the African human rights system, the African Court on Human and 
3HRSOHV¶5LJKWV µ$&+35¶HVWDEOLVhed in 2004,259 can receive applications or 
complaints submitted to it either by the African Commission on Human and 
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3HRSOHV¶ 5LJKWV µ$IULFDQ &RPPLVVLRQ¶ VWDWHs parties to the Protocol to the 
$IULFDQ &KDUWHU RQ +XPDQ DQG 3HRSOHV¶ 5LJKWV RQ WKH (VWDEOLVKPHnt of an 
$IULFDQ &RXUW RQ +XPDQ DQG 3HRSOHV¶ 5LJKWV,260 or other African 
intergovernmental organisations. The rules of standing of the ACHPR allow  
non-governmental organisations (with observer status before the African 
Commission) and individuals, from states which have made a declaration 
accepting the jurisdiction of the ACHPR, to institute cases directly.261 However, 
so far only seven countries have made such a declaration262 and the ACHPR is 
\HWWRGHFLGHRQDFDVHLQYROYLQJLQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶ULJKWV263 
The African Commission has dealt with very few cases involving indigenous 
SHRSOHV¶ ODQG DQG QDWXUDO UHVRXUFH ULJKWV264 In Social and Economic Rights 
Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria,265 it 
found that Nigeria had violated several articles of the African Charter and 
appealed to the government to ensure protection of the environment, health and 
livelihood of the Ogoni people.266 It did this by, inter alia, ensuring 
compensation to victims of human rights violations ² including relief and 
resettlement assistance to victims of government raids ² and undertaking a 
comprehensive clean-up of lands and rivers damaged by oil operators.267 The 
$IULFDQ &RPPLVVLRQ GHDOW ZLWK DQRWKHU FDVH LQYROYLQJ LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶
human rights in Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority 
Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya.268 
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This dispute involved a community which was forcefully evicted from their 
ancestral lands without consultation, consent, compensation or relocation. In its 
communication the Africa &RPPLVVLRQH[WHQGHG LQGLYLGXDODQGSHRSOHV¶ ULJKWV
under the African Charter to indigenous people and recognised specific rights to 
development. It requested that the Kenyan Government submit progress reports 
on the implementation of its decision. These reports required, inter alia, the 
payment of adequate compensation to the community for all loss suffered.269 
This was a progressive decision, calling for the compensation of victims for loss 
of property, development and natural resource rights, the freedom to practice 
their religion and culture and also requiring restitution of their land, with legal 
title and clear demarcation.270 
This review of international courts and treaty-monitoring bodies, as well as of 
two regional human rights systems271 suggests that states have an obligation 
under international law WR SURWHFW LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ FROOHFWLYH ULJKWs to land 
and natural resources. They add further weight to the argument that some of 
these rights now form part of customary international law. They also redefine the 
classic, state-centred, perception of international law by recognising the positive 
REOLJDWLRQRIVWDWHVWRJXDUDQWHHLQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶ODQGQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVDQG
participatory collective rights. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources emerged as a fundamental 
principle in international law, allowing postcolonial states to assert full 
sovereignty over natural resources. The right also accompanied by duties which 
limit how natural resources are to be managed within a state, particularly in order 
to protect other states against trans-boundary harms. It is contended that 
communities within a state must be regarded as beneficiaries of this right to 
permanent sovereignty. 
So what type of governmental system would be available to meet the 
indigenous claims for some degree of independence in order to secure land and 
natural resources rights? Governments will not respond to demands which would 
threaten their existence. Therefore, attempts to create internationally binding 
legal standards for indigenous peoples will face difficulties. This is especially so 
because although certain indigenous groups and individuals in some parts of the 
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world favour integration with the dominant society, there is a considerable 
number of who instead favour a degree of self-government. 
7KHPDLQWKUHDWWRLQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶VXUYLYDODULVHVIURPQDWLRQDOSROLFLHV
which disregard their land rights and their cultural rights, including policies 
which condone the invasion and expropriation of their lands and deprive them of 
the benefits arising from the use and extraction of their natural resources. 
Because dispossession poses a major threat to their survival in many parts of the 
world, LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ rights to land and natural resources need to be 
effectively protected and must be made enforceable under international human 
rights law. 
Although the mechanisms established under international law to secure 
LQGLJHQRXV SHRSOHV¶ FRQVXOWDWLRQ DQG SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ GHFLVLRQ-making often 
conflict with a state¶s sovereign claims to natural resources, these mechanisms in 
fact strengthen the normative impact of the right to permanent sovereignty. They 
bring a new meaning and relevance to participation and representation in the new 
century beyond the classic examples of expropriation and nationalisation of 
foreign-owned investment for which the right of permanent sovereignty was 
originally conceived. International law and international standards in this field 
are not however always well-developed. This is due to the mixture of hard- and 
soft-law instruments; while the challenges for international regulation are 
perhaps most noticeable in the context of access and benefit-sharing regimes, 
which remains underdeveloped despite their paramount importance for 
indigenous peoples to exercise resource rights. Moreover, there are evident 
limitations to the extent to which states will be willing to transfer the benefits 
arising from the exercise of sovereignty over natural resources to non-state 
actors, as can be seen from national laws that do not recognise property rights 
over subsoil resources to indigenous peoples. 
IQGLJHQRXVSHRSOHV¶ULJKW WRSHUPDQHQWVRYHUHLJQW\RYHUQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVLV
as an integral part of the right to self-determination under international law. 
These two rights delineate the degree of autonomy of indigenous peoples to  
self-government, including in relation to the governance of land and natural 
resources. The rights to self-determination and permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources provide the essential legal basis for indigenous peoples to 
triumph over assimilation and other neo-colonial practices. By establishing 
mechanisms that strengthen indigenous substantive and procedural rights to land 
and natural resources, states have redefined the notion of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources. But although these developments appear to upset to a 
FHUWDLQGHJUHHWKHFODVVLFQRWLRQRIVWDWHVRYHUHLJQW\WKH\DOVRVWUHQJWKHQVWDWHV¶
right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources; adding a new meaning 
and relevance to these legal terms; giving indigenous peoples (who, after all, are 
DOVR DQ HVVHQWLDO FRPSRQHQWRI D µVWDWH¶ WKH ULJKW WR DVVHUW ODQG ULJKWV DQG WR
define the fate of the natural resources in their lands. 
